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Practical Benefits for the Accused--A Case
Comparison of the U.S. Civilian and
Military Systems of Justice
Colonel Irvin M. Kent*
On 2 June 1969, a majority of the Supreme Court of the United States
in O'Callahan v. Parker' decided that, in order to preserve to military
personnel the benefits of indictment by grand jury and a trial by a jury
of his peers, U. S. Courts-Martial did not have jurisdiction of off-post,
non-service connected offenses. There is no doubt that a majority of the
Justices of the Supreme Court felt that this decision was essential to pre-
serve these important civil rights for accused servicemen. There is equally
no doubt that, as a result of this decision, great numbers of servicemen
who would have otherwise been tried by courts-martial, will be tried in
a variety of state and federal courts. This decision, therefore, makes
timely and urgent a consideration of the practical benefits to an accused
of trial in the military and civilian systems. Such a comparison is diffi-
cult because the civilian system is not unitary. Rules of evidence and
procedure vary between the states, between state and federal practice,
and in the latter, between various federal circuits. No attempt can or will
be made here to set forth any civilian rule as representing the totality of
civilian practice. Rather, the civilian rules cited are merely given as
examples of the systems to which servicemen are being increasingly sub-
jected as a result of the decision in the O'Callahan case. To avoid accusa-
tion that the civilian rules cited are examples of archaic, obsolete proce-
dures, most of the civilian authorities cited have been deliberately taken
from decisions rendered since the date of the Supreme Court's decision.
Conversely, in order to avoid an allegation that the military might have
reformed its rules because of the impact of O'Callahan v. Parker, most of
the military authorities cited ante-date that decision. In a few instances,
examples have been taken from military cases and authorities which have
0 A.B., Syracuse University; LL.B., Harvard Law School; Military Judge for the 7th
Circuit. The views expressed herein are those of the author alone and do not necessarily
represent those of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, or any of its
subordinate offices, agencies, or organizations.
1. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
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come since O'Callahan but in no case do'these examples represent a
change in the rules as they existed at the time of the Court's decision.
In no case has a military rule been cited which has since been changed
adversely to an accused person.
Rather than attempting extensive editorial comment, which might
be considered as biased, this article will simply present quotations from
military and civilian sources. The quotations are set in juxtaposition to
each other in order that the reader may decide for himself which system
offers the greater practical benefits to an accused; or to put the question
in another way, how much of a price must the accused serviceman pay
for the "benefits" of indictment by a grand jury and trial by a jury of
his peers?
In the words of Mr. Justice Douglas: "Substantially different rules of
evidence and procedure apply in military trials. ' 2 There is no question
of the truth of this statement. There is a very real question, however, as
to which set of rules provide greater practical benefits to an accused.
This discussion will be broken down into four categories: pretrial, trial
on the merits of the case, sentencing procedures, and post-trial matters.
Emphasis has been placed upon these areas of the law where the differ-
ences appear to the writer to be meaningful. The differences in the
areas not covered by this article are, in the opinion of this writer, not
very consequential.
I. PRETMIAL
A. Police Interrogation
An appropriate place to start would be the arrival of the police at
the scene of a crime, and the interrogation by the police of potential
suspects.
Civilian Example: Washington v. Nuckols3
Robert Nuckols and his companions telephoned the police and
an ambulance. When the officer of the Seattle Police Department
arrived, the two companions told him that Nuckols had shot Miss
Cantu and gave the officer an explicit description of Nuckols. The
officer went to the back door to check out the premises and there
he saw a man with long blonde hair, wearing cowboy boots who
met the description given to him for Nuckols. "Are you the one
2. Id.
3. 1 Wash. App. 133, 459 P.2d 971, 980 (1969).
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who shot the girl?" the officer asked. "Yes," Nuck6ls responded.-
(Emphasis supplied.)
Defendant's first assignment of error attacks the admission of
the statement "yes" in response to the inquiry by the arresting
officer. He argues that the officer intended to arrest him and there-
fore could not begin interrogation without first apprising him of
his constitutional rights...
The record indicates that the defendant was not in custody at
the time he answered the officer's inquiry. Nor can it be said that
he was deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
He had not been placed under arrest nor was there any indication,
at the time of the query, that he was not free to leave. As the trial
court correctly stated, the officer was still investigating and was not
interrogating the defendant in the sense of the decisions referred
to. The question and answer were properly admitted. (Emphasis
supplied.).
Military Rule: United States v. Wilson 4
The next assignment of error is that certain admissions of the
accused should have been excluded as involuntary. The operative
facts are these. A military police sergeant named Wang, while on
patrol duty, received notice of a shooting in the 503d Battalion
area. He went to the area and there observed a group of soldiers
standing about a fire. A military policeman pointed out appellants
as the persons identified to him by a group of Koreans as the men
who had shot their countryman. The sergeant approached the
group and, without addressing any member by name-but looking
directly at appellants-asked who had done the shooting. He made
no preliminary reference to the privilege against self-incrimination
secured at that time by Article of War 24, 10 USC § 1495. Appel-
lants responded to the question with the statement that they had
"shot at the man." This was the substance of Sergeant Wang's
testimony at the trial. The joint oral admission, which is said to
have been involuntary, is, of course, that made by appellants that
they had "shot at the man..."
We turn to the problem of whether the erroneous admission of
these statements requires that the convictions be reversed, enter-
taining no doubt that an affirmative answer is required. Where-
as here-an element of officiality attended the questioning which
produced the admissions, there is more than a violation of the
naked rule of Article 31(b), supra; there is an abridgement of the
policy underlying the Article which must-we think-be regarded
as "so overwhelmingly important in the scheme of military justice
as to elevate it to the level of a 'creative and indwelling principle'."
4. 2 U.S.C.M.A. 248, 8 C.M.R. 48, 54, 55 (1953).
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United States v. Lee (No. 200), 2 CMR 118. To put the matter
otherwise, we must and do regard a departure from the clear
mandate of the Article as generally and inherently prejudicial.
United States v. Berry (No. 69), 2 CMR 114, decided March 18,
1952. We might also observe that even under the old service view
of an error of this nature reversal would be required. (Emphasis
supplied.)
B. Pretrial Restraint
Much is made of the fact that the military system does not provide
for pretrial bail. Commanding officers of accused persons awaiting trial
do, however, have very broad discretion in determining the necessity
for and type of any pretrial restraint. One important factor should be
remembered. An accused in the military service awaiting trial by
court martial normally remains on a status of full pay and allowances
whereas a civilian accused, who is incarcerated pending trial, normally
sees his income drop to zero.
Civilian Examples: Hodge v. United States5
Appellant contends that refusal to release him on his own recog-
nizance pending trial was an abuse of discretion and prejudiced
him in preparation for trial. Abuse of discretion does not appear.
Appellant had counsel for five weeks prior to the request, which
was made on the scheduled date of trial. Appellant was from out
of state, with no local contacts, family or otherwise, willing to
vouch for him. On these facts, the judge could properly conclude
that it was not reasonably certain that the defendant would appear.
United States ex rel. Shakur v. Commissioner of Corrections6
The traditional bail standards applied in New York are entirely
consistent with the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8, (1951) and have been set forth in
People ex rel. Lobell v. McDonnell, 296 N.Y. 109, 111, 71 N.E.2d
423 (1947), recently approved by the New York Court of Appeals in
People ex rel. Gonzalez v. Warden, 21 N.Y.2d 18, 25, 286 N.Y.S.2d
240, 233 N.E.2d 265 (1967). A New York judge is required to take
the following factors into account when exercising his discretion
in setting bail:
The nature of the offense, the penalty which may be imposed,
the probability of of the willing appearance of the defendant
or his flight to avoid punishment, the pecuniary and social con-
5. 414 F.2d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1969).
6. 303 F. Supp. 303, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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dition of defendant and his general reputation and character,
and the apparent nature and strength of the proof as bearing on
the probability of his conviction.
Military Rule: Paragraph 20a thru c, Manual for Courts-Martial,
United States, 1969 (Rev.).
20. RESTRAINT a. Status of a person in arrest. As used in
this chapter, arrest is moral restraint imposed upon a person by
oral or written orders of competent authority limiting the person's
personal liberty pending disposition of charges. The restraint
imposed is binding upon the person arrested, not by physical force,
but by virtue of his moral and legal obligation to obey the order
of arrest. He is subject to the restrictions incident to arrest pre-
scribed in regulations of the Secretary concerned. A person in the
status of arrest cannot be required to perform his full military
duty, and if he is placed-by the authority who placed him in
arrest or by superior authority-on duty inconsistent with this
status his arrest is thereby terminated. This, however, does not
prevent his being required to do ordinary cleaning or policing, or
to take part in routine training and duties not involving the exer-
cise of command or the bearing of arms. But see 131c(3) with
respect to arrest in quarters imposed as a punishment under Article
15.
b. Restriction in lieu of arrest. An officer authorized to arrest
(21a) may, within his discretion and without imposing arrest,
restrict an accused person of his command, or subject to his au-
thority, to specified areas of a military command with the further
provision that he will participate in all military duties and activi-
ties of his organization while under the restriction. Thus, an ac-
cused person may be required to remain within a specified area at
specified times either because his continued presence pending
investigation may be necessary or because it may be considered a
wise precaution to restrict him to such an area in order that he
may not again be exposed to the temptation of misconduct similar
to that for which he is already under charges. Violations of these
restrictions are punishable as violations of Article 134, as are
breaches of punitive restrictions.
c. Confinement before trial. As used in this chapter, confinement
is physical restraint, imposed by either oral or written orders of
competent authority, -depriving a person of freedom pending the
disposition of charges. Confinement will not be imposed pending
trial unless deemed necessary to insure the presence of the accused
at the trial or because of the seriousness of the offense charged.
Post-trial confinement can be set aside to compensate for the improp-
erly imposed pretrial confinement.7
7. United States v. Jennings - U.S.C.M.A. - - C.M.R. - (1969).
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C. Voice Identification
Frequently, in order to assist witnesses in making identification of
suspects, the police will ask the suspects to speak certain words without
warning the suspect of his rights against self-incrimination.
Civilian Example: United States v. Wades
We have no doubt that compelling the accused merely to exhibit
his person for observation by a prosecution witness prior to trial
involves no compulsion of the accused to give evidence having
testimonial significance. It is compulsion of the accused to exhibit
his physical characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any knowl-
edge he might have. It is no different from compelling Schmerber
to provide a blood sample or Holt to wear the blouse, and, as in
those instances, is not within the cover of the privilege. Similarly,
compelling Wade to speak within hearing distance of the witnesses,
even to utter words purportedly uttered by the robber, was not
compulsion to utter statements of a "testimonial" nature; he was
required to use his voice as an identifying physical characteristic,
not to speak his guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)
Military Rule: United States v. Mewborn9
Also, we put aside the holding in Wade that requiring an indi-
vidual suspected of an offense to utter words or phrases for the
purpose of voice identification does not violate his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. Id., 388 U.S. 218, at page 222. We
examined that matter in United States v. Greer, supra, and
determined that, under the broader protections accorded an ac-
cused by Article 31 of the Uniform Code, he could not be com-
pelled to speak for voice identification. We are not persuaded this
construction of Article 31 was erroneous; and we adhere to the
view that, under Article 31, before an accused is asked to speak
for voice identification he must first be informed he has the right
to say nothing. (Emphasis supplied.)
D. Handwriting Exemplars
A similar problem arises with regard to the taking of handwriting
exemplars from a person suspected or accused of an offense.
Civilian Example: Gilbert v. State of California0
Petitioner was arrested in Philadelphia by an FBI agent and
refused to answer questions about the Alhambra robbery without
8. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
9. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 431, 38 C.M.R. 229, 232 (1968).
10. 338 U.S. 266 (1955).
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the advice of counsel. He later did answer questions of another
agent about some Philadelphia robberies in which the robber used
a handwritten note demanding that money be handed over to him,
and during that interrogation gave the agent the handwriting
exemplers. They were admitted in evidence at trial over objection
that they were obtained in violation of petitioner's Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights
First. The taking of the exemplers did not violate petitioner's
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The privi-
lege reaches only compulsion of "an accused's communications,
whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses
which are also communications, for example, compliance with a
subpeona to produce one's papers", and not "compulsion which
makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence'
* * *". Schmerber v. State of California 384 U.S. 757, 763-764,
86 S. Ct. 1826, 1833, 16 L.Ed.2d 908. One's voice and handwriting
are, of course, means of communication. It by no means follows,
however, that every compulsion of an accused to use his voice or
write compels a communication within the cover of the privilege.
A mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of what
is written, like the voice or body itself, is an identifying physical
characteristic outside its protection. (Emphasis supplied.)
This rule is still being applied by our federal courts; e.g., United States
v. King.11
Military Rule: United States v. White12
In United States v. Musguire, 9 USMCA 67, 68, 25 CMR 329,
we pointed out that "Article 31 is wider in scope than the Fifth
Amendment." We are not, therefore, dealing with a constitutional
right. To our knowledge, the Supreme Court has never construed
Article 31 contrary to the interpretation we accorded it in Minni-field. Consequently, we adhere to Minnifield, and reaffirm the rule
that an accused must be apprised of his rights under Article 31,
before he can be asked for samples of his handwriting. (Emphasis
supplied.)
E. Search and Seizure
Generally speaking, in civilian life a magistrate must be asked for a
search warrant, and in the military, a commanding officer has similar
powers. Both must have probable cause for their actions. There is, how-
ever, at least one-area -where there would appear to be a gross difference.
11. 415 F.2d 737, 739 (6th Cir. 1969).
12. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 211, 38 C.M.R. 9, 14 (1967).
192
Vol. 9: 186, 1970-1971
Practical. Benefits for. the Accused
between -civilian and military rules and -these stem from the existence
of supervisory duty to maintain order and discipline and which, in the
civilian community, has been held to either reduce or eliminate the
need for probable cause for a search. Two cases, one civilian and one
military, dealing with a search for narcotics upon return to a civilian
job corps camp and to a military installation are cited.
Civilian Example: United States v. Coles13
On the morning of March 24, 1969, defendant, a student or
"corpsman" at the Acadia Civilian Conservation Center was re-
turning to the Center by bus from Boston, somewhat overdue on a
leave he had been granted. In response to defendant's telephoned
request, Gordon L. Stanley, an Administrative Assistant at the Cen-
ter, met defendant's bus when it arrived in Ellsworth, Maine at
around 9:45 a.m. Defendant had a small suitcase with him, which
he placed on the floor in the rear of Stanley's automobile. Stanley
and defendant then drove to a garage in Ellsworth where they met
Anderson. After several local stops, the three drove to the Acadia
Center, Anderson following Stanley and defendant in his own
car. Upon their arrival at around noon, defendant started to walk
to the mess hall for lunch, but Stanley told him that Anderson
wanted to see him in his office. Defendant removed his suitcase
from the automobile and followed Stanley to the door of Ander-
son's office. Anderson met him there and said, "Come into my
office," or words to that effect. Defendant testified that he did not
want to enter Anderson's office but did so because be believed that
Anderson had the authority to punish or expel corpsmen for mis-
conduct or disobedience. Stanley followed defendant into the
office. To this point, there had been no conversation regarding the
suitcase, nor had there been any mention of marijuana. Once in-
side the office, however, Anderson said to defendant, "I would
like to look at the contents of your suitcase," or words to that
effect. Defendant testified that he did not want to allow Anderson
to inspect its contents but did so, involuntarily, because he felt he
had no choice. In any event, defendant remained silent, opened his
suitcase, and started to remove the contents ...
Defendant challenges the search as a violation of the right,
secured to him by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Government
concedes that the search was conducted without a search warrant
and, quite properly, does not atempt to support the search as inci-
dent to a lawful arrest. But the Government defends the search as
legally justified because defendant consented to it. The Court,
13. 302 F. Supp. 99, 100 (ND Maine 1969).
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however, does not find it necessary to pass upon this issue, since it
has concluded, upon a broader ground, that the search and seizure
was reasonable and did not infringe defendant's Fourth Amend-
ment rights. The Court has no doubt that the search of defendant's
suitcase was a constitutional exercise of Anderson's authority, as
the Administrative Officer of the Acadia Center, to maintain
proper standards of conduct and discipline at the Center...
It seems clear that the object of the search of defendant's suitcase
was to determine whether contraband was being brought to the
Center. Quite plainly, the investigation was conducted solely for
the purpose of ensuring proper moral and disciplinary conditions
at the Center, an obligation mandated by federal statute. Although
no case precisely in point has been found, the present case is
closely analogous to Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy
State University, 284 F.Supp. 725 (M.D.Ala.1968), where a search
by the Dean of Men and two narcotics agents of a University
student's dormitory room was held to be constitutionally permis-
sible as a reasonable exercise of the University's supervisory duty
to maintain order and discipline on the campus; ....
As the Court observed in Moore v. Student Affairs Committee
of Troy State University, supra at 730-731:
It is settled law that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
reasonable searches when the search is conducted by a superior
charged with a responsibility of maintaining discipline and
order or of maintaining security.
Military Rule: United States v. Brown14
The circumstances under which the search took place were
briefly as follows: On June 14, 1958, the accused and nine other
soldiers, all of whom were on pass, were transported to Community
Center 1 on an Army truck. Six or seven of the ten had been sus-
pected for the past four months of using narcotics. The accused's
commanding officer, Lieutenant Clark, received information that
one of the ten had borrowed $10.00 before going on pass. Included
in the group was one individual, not the accused, who reputedly
had been "caught" with narcotics but never tried because of a
defect in the chain of custody. Acting upon his suspicions, Lieu-
tenant Clark arranged for a search of all ten of the men upon their
return. When they returned on the truck, all ten were "appre-
hended," searched, stripped, and searched again. Sergeant First
Class Templeton testified that he found two bottles of heroin
(Prosecution Exhibit 1) on the accused . ..
The record shows no basis for any such belief by Lieutenant
Clark. He merely suspected several men. This suspicion had con-
14. 10 U.S.C.M.A. 482, 28 C.M.R. 48, 52 (1959).
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tinued for a period of four months with some surveillance during
that period, yielding no results. The only circumstance which
apparently differentiates the evening chosen for the search from
any other evening was the information that one of the ten men
had borrowed $10.00. As appellate defense. counsel contends, if
possession of money was to be the deciding factor, the search
might better have been held immediately after payday. An appre-
hension may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence of
crime. Nor can an apprehension be validated by what it uncovers.
While there is substantial discretion vested in the commanding
officer to order a search of persons and property under his com-
mand, consideration of all the circumstances herein make it clear
beyond cavil that Lieutenant Clark acted on nothing more than
mere suspicion. Reasonable or probable cause was clearly lacking
for both the apprehension and the search and, although the mili-
tary permits certain deviations from civilian practice in the pro-
cedures for initiating a search, the substantive rights of the
individual and the necessity that probable cause exist therefor
remain the same. Unreasonable searches and seizures will not be
tolerated. The great importance attached to the fundamental
protection of the Constitution against unreasonable searches and
seizures requires no elaboration. While we recognize the com-
manding officer's traditional authority to conduct a search in order
to safeguard the security of his command, that issue is not pre-
sented here.
The action of Lieutenant Clark here was with utter disregard
for the rights of the accused and the others. He acted upon mere
suspicion with no factual basis for his action. He ordered a whole-
sale search of all those in the truck, those "suspected" and those
regarded as completely innocent. He ordered that any suspicious
objects be seized and turned over to him. The search was general
and exploratory in nature and wholly lacking in reasonable cause.
Without the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search,
i.e., the bottles of heroin, the prosecution's case must fall.
F. Pretrial Disclosure
As every experienced defense counsel knows, few things are more
important to an accused person than knowing what evidence the
Government has for use against him; who the Government's witnesses
will be; and what they have previously said. Prior to June 1, 1957, this
area undoubtedly provided the biggest single difference in favor of an
accused, between the military and the civilian systems.1 5 Despite the
15. See, Kent, The Jencks Case: The Viewpoint of a Military Lawyer, 45 A.B.A.J.
819 (1959).
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decision in United States v. Jencks,'8 and the so-called Jencks Act 7
there still remains some considerable difference between the military
and civilian rules in this area.
Civilian Examples: Posey v. United States"8
The appellant did not make any showing of "particularized
need" for disclosure of the grand jury minutes and the record
clearly indicates the contrary. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to order the grand jury minutes produced
for inspection by the defense.
United States v. Withers19
Three contested requests remain. In request 3, the defendant
asks that he be permitted to inspect and copy all written statements
concerning himself made by any of his codefendants to the Gov-
ernment. Such statements are not discoverable under Rule 16 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, United States v. West-
moreland, 41 F.R.D. 419, 427 (S.D. Ind. 1967), or on any other
basis, Morgan v. United States, 380 F.2d 686, 698-699 (9th Cir.
1967). Request 3 is therefore denied.
In request 5, defendant Rattet asks for a list of witnesses whom
the Government expects to call at trial, and in request 6, for
copies of any F.B.I. arrest and conviction records of these witnesses.
Neither request is permitted under Rule 16 or [sic] on any other
basis except by statute in capital cases.
Defendant Rattet has moved for an order upon the Government
to produce any favorable evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), including the
criminal records of certain witnesses who may testify against him.
As to the latter request, the Government need not disclose its
witnesses prior to trial, United States v. Manhattan Brush Co.,
38 F.D.R. 4, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), and the criminal records of such
witnesses are likewise free from pretrial discovery under Brady or
on any other ground. (Emphasis supplied.)
Military Rule: Paragraph 45b, Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, 1969, (Rev.), in discussing the duties of the trial counsel (prose-
cutor), states:
Immediately upon receipt of charges referred to him for trial,
he will serve a copy of the charge sheet, as received and corrected
by him, on the accused and will inform the defense counsel that
16. 353 U.S. 667 (1957).
17. 18 U.S.C. -3500.
18. 416 F.2d 545, 557 (5th Cir. 1969).
19. 303 F. Supp. 641, 645 (N.D. I11. 1969).
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the copy has been so served. Except as otherwise directed by the
convening authority (see, for example, 151b(l) and (3)), he will
permit the defense to examine from time to time any paper ac-
companying the charges, including the report of investigation and
papers sent with the charges on a rehearing. He will also permit
the defense to examine from time to time the order convening
the court and all amending orders. Before trial, he should advise
the defense of the probable witnesses to be called by the prosecu-
tion, and the fact that the defense has not been so advised with re-
spect to a witness who appears at the trial may be a ground for a
continuance. (Emphasis supplied.)
An interesting illustration of the application of the rule set forth above
and that enunciated in United States v. Jencks, 20 may be found in
United States v. Heinel.21 The "report of investigation" includes the
pretrial hearing conducted under Article 32, Uniform Code of Military
Justice 22 which is the military equivalent of the grand jury proceed-
ing.23 United States v. Nichols2 4 illustrates this importance.
G. Speedy Trial
All accused persons in the United States are entitled to a speedy trial
by virtue of either the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution (civilian) or by Articles 10 and 33, Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice25 (military). Nevertheless, certain substantial differences
remain in terms of the practical approach of the civilian and the
military courts.
Civilian Examples: Urquidi v. United States26
Urquidi's sole point is that the court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss the indictment because he had been denied a
speedy trial ...
The motion to dismiss was made on the opening day of trial.
jCounsel claimed that during the six months that had elapsed,
Urquidi, who was in jail, was pressured by government agents to
assist them by implicating others dealing in narcotics. No claim
was-made that the fairness of Urquidi's trial would be affected,
20. Supra note 16.
21. 9 US.C.M.A. 259, 26 C.M.R. 39, 41 (1958).
22. 10 U.S.C. 832.
23. Hearings Before the House Committee on Armed Services, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. on
H.R. 2498, at 997.
24. 8 U.S.C.M.A. 119, 23 C.M.R. 343, 848 (1957).
25. 10 U.S.C. 810, 83.
26. 271 F.2d 654, 655 (6th Cir. 1967).
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that counsel's preparation for trial was hampered, that the testi-
mony of any witness was lost, or that anything else prejudicial
occurred by reason of the delay. The trial judge pointed out that
during the period in question the court was moving to new
quarters, that for part of the time the U.S. Attorney was ill, and
that the continuances were almost all for the convenience of the
court. He also noted that there had been no prior objection. The
motion to dismiss was denied.
We find here no deprivation of the constitutional right to a
speedy trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment. (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
Falgout v. Colorado27
Where the issue of speedy trial has involved the requirement of
Article II, Section 16 of the Colorado Constitution, this Court
has made it very clear that a speedy public trial is a relative concept
depending upon the circumstances of each case and consistent with
the court's business, and the burden is upon the defendant to prove
that he has been denied an expeditious trial to his prejudice. (Em-
phasis supplied.)
Military Rule: United States v. Brown28
Of course, an accused is not automatically entitled to a dismissal
of all charges against him. Rather, the law officer must decide, from
all the circumstances, whether the prosecution has proceeded with
"reasonable dispatch". United States v. Callahan, 10 USMCA 156,
27 CMR 230.
In the instant case, the law officer was aware of the date the
accused was originally confined, when charges were preferred,
referred for trial and served upon the accused. One hundred and
eight days had elapsed before the accused was produced before a
court-martial for arraignment. Obviously, each successive step was
taken only after substantial delay. But, rather than explain these
deficiencies, trial counsel, after conceding that the required pretrial
steps had taken "a little longer than is desirable," lightly dis-
missed them with the assertion that he had no knowledge of the
circumstances thereof. The law officer reflected a similar approach
to the problem for he immediately called upon the accused to
establish specific prejudice. When no further evidence was ad-
vanced by the defense, he denied the motion before him. By these
pronouncements he demonstrated his misconception of the effects
of Articles 10 and 33. Rather than require the prosecution affirma-
tively to justify the delays, he called upon the accused to establish
27. 459 P.2d 572, 577 (Colo. 1959).
28. 10 U.S.C.M.A. 498, 28 C.M.R. 64, 69 (1959).
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specific prejudice. This shifting of the burden of proof, or explana-
tion, prevented the establishment of the circumstances of the
delays at the trial level-the only satisfactory forum for conducting
truly adversary proceedings, and for testing the validity of evidence
in the time-honored process of cross-examination. By this action
the law officer curtailed the development of all the circumstances
essential to a proper determination of whether or not the lapse of
time was due to purposeful or oppressive design on the part of the
prosecution or to a lack of reasonable diligence. (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
II. TRIAL ON THE MERITS
While the rules of evidence and the requirements for instruction on
the law to the triers of fact by the judge are generally similar, there are
significant differences between the military and the civilian systems.
For one thing, in the military system an accused person is somewhat
less dependent upon the skill of his counsel in making appropriate and
timely objections to the introduction of evidence and in requests for
instructions on special defenses and the defense's theory of the case.
One of the major differences between military and civilian practice,
which is difficult to document by case quotations, is that when a case is
referred for trial in the military, it is referred to a specific court-martial.
The accused is thus put on notice of the name of the military judge,
and of the names of the members of the court-martial. Therefore,
in making a decision as to whether to ask for trial by a military
judge alone, or by the full court-martial, the accused and his counsel
have advanced knowledge of the personalities concerned and can
make appropriate research into their backgrounds for an informed
decision. In civilian practice, however, while the accused normally
knows the name of the judge who will preside at his trial, if he
were to waive trial by jury, he does not know who would have served
on the jury had he demanded trial by jury. Indeed, in some states, even
the list of veniremen is kept a closely guarded secret until the time of
trial, and is not made known to an accused until after he has made his
decision as to whether to ask for trial by judge alone or demand trial
by jury. Further, as a practical matter, it is much more difficult for the
defense to obtain all of the background of the potential jury members
than it is for the defense counsel in the military to obtain information
about the background of the named members of the court. In the mili-
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tary, therefore, an accused has. a much-better basis for. his decisions with
regard to challenges, both peremptory and for cause.
A. Admission of Hearsay Evidence against an Accused
Civilian Example: United States v. Shiver29
(2) The statement made by Columbus, Georgia, Detective
Featherstone that his investigation revealed that the car was stolen
out of Miami Beach, Florida, was admitted without objection,
though it is pure hearsay, since he could not have known the facts
of his own knowledge. This testimony presents the problem of
considering the weight to be given to hearsay evidence admitted
without objection.
"The general rule is that such hearsay evidence may properly
be considered in determining the facts, but the authorities are in
disagreement as to the weight to be given it. The rule followed in
this circuit is that such evidence is to be given its natural probative
effect as if it were in law admissible. Daniel v. United States, 234
F.2d 102 (5 Cir. 1956). (Emphasis supplied.)
Military Rule: Paragraph 139a, Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, 1969 (Rev.).
Hearsay may not be recited or otherwise introduced in evidence,
and it does not become competent evidence by reason of a mere
failure to object to its reception in evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
B. Inquiry by the Court into Voluntariness
of a Pretrial Confesssion
Civilian Example: Moreno v. Beto30
A trial court is not in error for failing to inquire sua sponte into
voluntariness, where that issue is not raised.
Military Rules: Paragraph 140a, Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, 1969 (Rev.).
The admissibility of a confession or admission of the accused
must be established by an affirmative showing that it was voluntary,
unless the defense expressly contests to the omission of such a
showing.
Paragraphs 5-1 and 5-2, DA Pam 27-9, Military Judges Guide, dated
19 May 1969.
5-1. General. This section applies to any pretrial statement made
by an accused regardless of whether the statement is inculpatory,
exculpatory, an admission, or confession. To be admissible against
29. 414 F.2d 461, 463 (5th Cir. 1969).
30. 415 F.2d 154, 158 (5th Cir. 1969).
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the accused, a pretrial statement must be voluntary. A statement
is not voluntary if it has been obtained or induced by use of a
threat, promise, inducement, duress, or physical or mental abuse
amounting to coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful induce-
ment. Furthermore, a statement is not voluntary unless, where
applicable, it has been obtained in accordance with the procedural
requirements set forth in Article 31(b), UCMJ, Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 US 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), United States v. Tempia,
16 USCMA 629, 37 CMR 249 (1967), and subsequent cases. When
an accused or suspect is deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way (e.g., questioned after being ordered to report),
during the course of an investigation conducted with some color of
officiality, all warning and waiver requirements apply to statements
made by him in response to any interrogation. In this regard, Title
II of the "Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968"
purporting to prescribe rules for admissibility in Federal courts,
has no applicability to trials by courts-martial.
5-2. Admissibility. A pretrial statement offered by the prosecu-
tion cannot be admitted into evidence unless the military judge is
convinced that the statement, if shown to have been made by the
accused, was made voluntarily. Although court members are ap-
prised of admissibility, the military judge's specific factual find-
ings should be announced only during an out-of-court hearing or
side bar conference. Except when the defense expressly consents
to the omission of such a showing, and to admissibility of the
statement, the burden is on the prosecution to prove the voluntari-
ness of such a statement. Failure to object does not constitute
consent. (Emphasis supplied)
C. Impact of Character Evidence introduced
on Behalf of an Accused
Civilian Example:
Extract from lecture by Judge John J. Dunn, Trial Judge, Denver
County Court. Sample instruction distributed at lecture, 24 November
1969 at University of Denver Law School.
If you believe from the evidence that at the time this charge
was made against the defendant he was a man of good character,
you should take such good character into consideration in passing
upon the question of his guilt or innocence.
This evidence is as proper for your consideration as any other
evidence in the case; but the rule of law is, that if the jury, upon
consideration of all the evidence in the case, are [sic] satisfied be-
yond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, they must so
.fiid,-noatwithstanding his good character...
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Military Rule: Paragraph 9-20, DA Pam 27-9, Military Judges Guide,
dated 1 May 1969.
9-20. Character Evidence. a. Evidence of Accused's Good Charac-
ter Adduced to Show Probability of Innocence. If evidence of the
accused's good character has been introduced as bearing on the
general issue of guilt or innocence, the court should ordinarily be
instructed on its effect, and must be so instructed upon request (ex-
cept in the rare case when an accused has judicially admitted
guilt). Each instruction should be carefully tailored with due
regard to the particular facts of a case and any specific pro-
posed instructions. The court may be instructed substantially as
follows:
"To show the probability of his innocence, the defense in this case
has introduced evidence of the accused's good character including
but not limited to (evidence of his military record and standing as
shown by efficiency reports) (evidence of his general character as a
moral, well-conducted person and law-abiding citizen). In rebut-
tal, the prosecution has introduced evidence of his bad character
including but not limited to (specify rebuttal evidence within the
general scope of the defense character evidence)). The law recog-
nizes that a person of good character is not as likely to commit an
offense as is a person of bad character. Evidence of the accused's
good character, therefore, is admissible as tending to show that it
is improbable that the accused committed the offense(s) charged.
Considered and weighed alone, or in connection with the presump-
tion of innocence and all the other evidence in the case, this evi-
dence of the accused's good character may be sufficient to cause a
reasonable doubt to remain as to his guilt, thereby warranting an
acquittal. On the other hand, the inference of innocence to be
drawn from such evidence may be more than offset (by the prose-
cution's evidence of the accused's bad character, and) by the other
evidence in the case tending to establish the accused's guilt. As
members of the court, the final determination as to the weight to
be accorded this and all other evidence in the case rests solely with
you." (Emphasis supplied.)
D. Impact of Accomplice Testimony and
Evidence of Uncharged Misconduct
Civilian Examples: United States v. Johnson31
The record is clear that appellant made no request of the trial
judge to instruct the jury as to the manner in which it should treat
the testimony of an accomplice, or for what purpose it should con-
31. 415 F.2d 653, '655 (9th Cir. 1969).
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sider evidence of prior uncharged offenses. No objection was made
by appellant to the failure of the district court to instruct the jury
on either one of said subjects as required by Rule 30 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. In these circumstances, appellant
must establish that the trial judge's failure to instruct on such sub-
jects, -sua sponte, constitutes plain error. Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure,. Rule 52(b).
State v. Oland32
Defendant assigns as error the court's failure to instruct the jury
that the testimony of accomplices should be viewed with caution.
We need not consider whether such an instruction should have
been given, because there was no request for it. (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
Military Rules: Paragraph 9-22, DA Pam 27-9, Military Judges Guide,
dated 19 May 1969.
Instructions on accomplice testimony should be given whenever
the evidence tends to indicate that a witness adverse to the accused
was culpably involved in a crime with which the accused is
charged. In an appropriate case, when such instructions are re-
quested, or when the accomplice is a principal witness for the
proscution, such instructions must be given. (Emphasis supplied.)33
Paragraph 9-31 of the above.
When evidence of other offenses or acts of misconduct of the ac-
cused is properly admissible as an exception to the general rule ex-
cluding such evidence, the following limiting instruction must be
given sua sponte. (Emphasis supplied.)
E. The Defense of Entrapment
Civilian Example: New Mexico v. Carrillo34
The jury was instructed that the State had the burden of prov-
ing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the sale had occurred. Defen-
dant asserts the instruction is incomplete. He claims the instruc-
tion should also have told the j ury that the State must prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that entrapment did not occur. Defen-
dant neither submitted any requested instruction nor objected to
the instruction given, The asserted error has not been preserved
for review.
32. Or. A pp., 461 P.2d 277,- 280 (1969).
33. See aso, United States v. Lell, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 161, 36 C.M.R.- 317 (1966); United
States v. Stephen, 15 US.C.M.A. 314, 35 C.M.R. 286 (1965).
34. 80 N.M. -697, 460 P.2d 62, 64 (1969). .
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Military Rule: Paragraph 6-8, DA Pam 27-9, Military Judges Guide,
dated 19 May 1969.
Entrapment. When an issue of entrapment is raised, the military
judge must instruct, sua sponte, on this defense. Each instruction
should be carefully tailored with due regard to the particular facts
of a case and any specific proposed instructions submitted by coun-
sel.
F. Mental Condition of the Accused-Irresistible Impulse35
Civilian Example: State v. Wahrlich 36
If we assume that which the jury was not required to believe,
that the appellant's self-control was overpowered, this would not
constitute a defense to the charge. Irresistible impulse is not a le-
gal defense to a criminal charge in Arizona.
Military Rule: United States v. Trede37
[W]e are concerned here only with the type of insanity which is
described by the witnesses as "irresistible impulse." There are a
good many jurisdictions which have refused to recognize that men-
tal condition as a defense to a crime... Were this a case of first
impression we might be inclined to follow those authorities. How-
ever, it is not, and this particular type of mental disease has long
been a defense to a crime under military law provided it is a result
of a diseased or deranged mind. Winthrop's Military Law and Prec-
edents, 2d ed., Reprint 1920, page 294.
G. Voluntary Intoxication (by Drugs or Alcohol)
Civilian Example: State v. Roisland s
The defendant argues that the trial judge should not have given
the following instruction:
Voluntary consumption of drugs is not an excuse for a crime. No
act of a defendant in a voluntary drugged state is less criminal be-
cause of his condition if it merely makes him do things he would
not do otherwise. You may consider consumption of drugs in de-
termining the purpose, motive or intent with which the defendant
may have acted, but a voluntary drugged state is not a defense if it
does not interfere with the defendant's ability to form the intent to
commit the crime. To be available as a defense a voluntary drugged
35. See pERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 868-875 (2d ed. 1969) for an excellent discussion.
36. - 105 Ariz.' 102, 459 P.2d 727, 729 (1969).
37. 2 U.S.C.M.A. 581, 10 C.M.R. 79, 83 (1953).
38. Or. App., 459 P.2d 555, 558 (1969).
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state must result in a diseased. mind, or some other form of insanity.
The burden is on the defendant to prove that defense by a prepon-
derance of the evidence . . . (Emphasis supplied.) The instruction
was entirely proper.
Military Rules: Paragraph 6-12, DA Pam 27-9, Military Judges Guide,
dated 19 May 1969.
6-12. Voluntary Intoxication. Because of the complex problems
that may arise in cases involving the effect of voluntary drunken-
ness, great care should be exercised in drafting proper instructions.
The military judge must instruct, sua sponte, whenever voluntary
drunkenness is an issue in a case involving premeditation, specific
intent, or knowledge. Each instruction should be carefully tailored
with due regard to the particular facts of a case and any specific
proposed instructions submitted by counsel.
Note 1. The following instruction is designed for situations where
due to voluntary drunkenness, an accused may not have premedi-
tated, entertained specific intent, or possessed knowledge requisite
to the perpetration of an alleged offense:
The court is advised that an issue concerning voluntary drunk-
enness has been raised by the evidence with respect to the offense(s)
of (specify the relevant offense(s)). With reference to the evidence
tending to show that the accused was intoxicated at the time of the
alleged offense(s) of (specify the relevant offense(s)), you are advised
that you may consider evidence of voluntary drunkenness in deter-
mining whether the accused had sufficient mental capacity to and
did in fact entertain the (premeditated design to kill) (specific in-
tent) (knowledge) involved in the offense of (premeditated mur-
der) (willful disobedience) (larceny) (attempted )
(. ). (The specific intent involved in the offense of
willful disobedience is a specific intent to defy authority.) (The
(specific intent) (knowledge) involved in the offense of (specify the
offense) is (a specific intent to .) (knowledge that
).) In determining this issue, you must consider
all relevant facts and circumstance including but not limited to
(specify significant evidentiary factors bearing upon the issue and
indicate the respective contentions of counsel for both sides).
A person is drunk who is under the influence of an intoxicant so
that the use of his faculties is materially impaired. The fact that a
person was drunk at the time he allegedly committed an offense
does not necessarily show that he was deprived of his reasoning
ability, for a person may be drunk and at the same time be aware
of his acts and their probable consequences. The basic question
raised by the evidence of voluntary drunkenness and presented for
your determination is whether the accused's intoxication affected
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his mental faculties to such a degree as to raise a reasonable doubt
that he (entertained a (premeditated design to kill) (specific intent
to )) (knew that "___ ,)
The burden of proof is upon the Government to establish the
guilt of the accused by legal and competent evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt. Consequently, unless you are satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused was mentally capable of (enter-
taining the (premeditated design to kill) (specific intent)) (having
the knowledge) involved in the offense of (premeditated murder)( ), and did in fact have such state of mind at the
time of the alleged offense, you must find him not guilty of that of-
fense. (Emphasis supplied.)
United States v. Miller3 9
Furthermore, the possible effect of intoxication with regard even
to the crime of failure to obey, and certainly as to disrespect to-
ward a superior officer should have been spelled out. In each of
these offenses it is essential that the accused have known that the
individual whom he disobeyed, or toward whom he evidenced dis-
respect, was in fact a superior officer. Manual for Courts-Martial,
supra paragraphs 168, 169b. If he was intoxicated to the point of
ambulatory stupefaction, it might well be that he did not possess
this requisite knowledge. We have not all overlooked the failure
of defense counsel at the trial to request such instructions. How-
ever, where affirmative defenses of this character are so closely re-
lated to the elements of the offense or offenses charged, and are
fairly raised by the evidence, the law officer is under an indepen-
dent duty to give necessary and appropriate instructions, and a de-
fense failure to request will not be held to constitute waiver. (Em-
phasis supplied.)
H. The Theory of the Case
Civilian Example: Oregon v. Evans40
(2) When a defendant seeks to have the court instruct the jury
concerning the defendant's theory of the case, it is his duty to re-
quest an instruction which is well founded in law. State v. Zusman,
Or. App., 460 P.2d 872 (1969); State v. Patterson, supra. Since the
requested instruction did not accurately state the law, it was not
error for the trial court to refuse to give it.
39. 2 U.S.C.M.A. 194, 7 C.M.R. 70, 71 (1953).
40. Or. App., 460 P.2d 1021, 1022 (1969).
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Military Rules: United States v. Smith4
Thus it is required, inter alia, that instructions be given at trial
not only on the elements of the offense but, in addition, on all is-
sues, defenses, and lesser offenses raised reasonably by the evidence.
The court members must be furnished with the law pertinent to
the facts developed in order that they may resolve the issues before
them. And, of course, an abstract statement of law may not suffice
to insure intelligent determination of the questions posed.
Lest there be room for any uncertainty in the mind of any-
one, therefore, we deem it appropriate to elaborate on the sense
in which this Court has used the terms "tailor," and "tailoring."
What is contemplated is the affirmative submission of the respec-
tive theories, both of the Government and of the accused on trial,
to the triers of fact, with lucid guideposts, to the end that they may
knowledgeably apply the law to the facts as they. find them.
United States v. Condron42
In the absence of a clear and unquestioned showing of waiver,
we are governed by the proposition that the basic responsibility
for giving proper instructions rests upon the law officer.
I. The Requirement for Jury Unanimity
Much has been made of the fact that in a civilian jury a unanimous
vote is required to produce a verdict of guilty. This is correct, but what
is frequently forgotten is the fact that it also requires a unanimous vote
to produce an acquittal. One hold-out on the jury can prevent a verdict
in either direction.43 This rule is'so well known as not to require a ci-
tation of a civilian example.
Military Rule: Paragraph 74d(3), Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, 1969 (Rev.).
No person may be convicted of an offense for which the death
penalty is made mandatory by law (see, for example, Art. 106), ex-
cept by the concurrence of all the members of the court-martial
present at the time the vote is taken. No person may be convicted
of any other offense, when voting is required (74d(l)), except by
the concurrence of two thirds of the members present at the time
the vote is taken (Art. 52). If, in computing the number of votes
41. 13 U.S.C.M.A. 471, 33 C.M.R. 3, 6 (1963).
42. 17 US.C.M.A. 367, 38 C.M.R. 165, 167 (1968).
43. For an example of the problems this has caused to civilian trial judges, see, e.g.,
United States v. Winn, 415 F.2d. 135 (10th Cir. 1969).
207
. . Vol. 9:-186, 1970-1971
required, a fraction results, the fraction will be counted as one;
thus, if five members are to vote, a requirement that two-thirds
concur is not met unless four concur. A finding of not guilty results
as to any specification or charge if no other valid finding is reached
thereon; however, a court may reconsider any finding before the
same is formally announced in open session. The court may also
reconsider any finding of guilty on its own motion at any time be-
fore it has first announced the sentence in the case. Any member of
a court may propose that a finding be reconsidered. If a reballot is
proposed by any member as to a finding of guilty of an offense for
which the death penalty is mandatory by law, an additional ballot
shall be taken immediately. Otherwise, the question shall be deter-
mined on secret written ballot, and a reballot shall be taken on a
prior not guilty finding when a majority of the members vote in
favor thereof or on a prior guilty finding if more than one-third of
the members favor reballoting. (Emphasis supplied.)
III. THE SENTENCING PROCESS
The major difference between the military and the civilian tribunal
in the sentencing process is that in the military, this process is always a
result of an adversary proceeding in which every bit of evidence to be
considered by the court in imposing sentence is made known to the ac-
cused and his counsel, and is subject to their objection, rebuttal or ex-
planation. This is much less likely to be true in the civilian commu-
nity.44
A. Impact of a Guilty Plea on Sentence Procedures
Civilian Examples: Parish v. Beto4 5
Second, there is no federal constitutional necessity for a jury to
set punishment on a guilty plea. A jury was empaneled only be-
cause one was required at the time by Texas law in all capital
cases. In essence, the facts of this case disclose that appellant en-
tered a plea of guilty and received the sentence agreed upon as a
result of plea bargaining. We have held that this is constitutionally
permissible. (Emphasis supplied.)
New Mexico v. Maimona46
As to the first three of his claims, this court has held that a vol-
untary plea of guilty waives the right to preliminary hearing, right
to counsel and the right to aid with defense. (Emphasis supplied.)
44. Steele, Counsel Can Count in Federal Sentencing, 56 A.BAJ. 37 (1970).
45. 414 F.2d 767, 772 (5th Cir. 1969).
46. 80 N.M. 562, 458 P.2d 814, 815 (1969).
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Military Rule: United States v. Allen 47
Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice the accused's guilt
and sentence must be determined by the court-martial. To avoid
the strain and the problems of a trial on the merits, the accused
can plead guilty. If he enters into a pretrial agreement in regard to
his plea with the convening authority, the agreement cannot trans-
form the trial into an empty ritual .... True, the plea disposes of
the necessity for the presentation of evidence of guilt and it elimi-
nates the requirement of formal instructions to the court-martial
•.. But there is still the vital question of sentence. Speaking of the
importance of this question, we said in United States v. Brasher, 2
USCMA 50, 52, 6 CMR 50: "In a special and peculiar sense the
sentence of the law for adjudged misconduct ... is the product of
a trial court. It alone, of all agencies of the law, is authorized to
'adjudge' the law's penalty."
The sentence proceeding is an integral part of the court-martial
trial. United States v. Strand, 6 USCMA 297, 306, 20 CMR 13.
Plainly, therefore, counsel's duty to represent the accused does not
end with the findings. Remaining for determination is the ques-
tion of the accused's liberty, property, social standing-in fact, his
whole future. And his lawyer is charged with the substantial re-
sponsibility of appealing on his behalf to the conscience of the
court. (Emphasis supplied.)
B. One-Step v. Two-Step Procedures
In certain civilian tribunals, the jury also determines the sentence.
Hence, it may hear evidence which is relevant only to sentencing and
which, indeed, may be very prejudicial to the accused on the merits of
the case, before the jury has decided the question of guilt or innocence.
The military's is a two-step process.
Civilian Example: Cook v. Smith48
As Georgia courts construe this statute, it authorizes submission to
a jury of proof of a prior conviction during the trial and before de-
termination of a defendant's guilt. The appellate courts of Georgia
have held that this procedure is not a violation of the constitu-
tional rights of the accused. (Emphasis supplied.)
Military Rule: Paragraph 75b(2), Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, 1969 (Rev.).
This paragraph provides for the pre-sentencing procedure, after a
court artial has reached findings of guilty. At this point:
47. 8 U.S.C.M.A. 504, 25 C.M.R. 8, 11 (1957).
48. 303 F. Supp. 90, 92 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
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The trial counsel will next introduce evidence of any previous
convictions of the accused by courts-martial. This evidence is not
limited to offenses similar to the one of which the accused stands
convicted. The evidence must, however, relate to offenses commit-
ted during the six years next preceding the commission of any of-
fense of which the accused stands convicted.
C. Consideration by the Court of Ex Parte Investigations
into the Background of the Accused
Civilian Examples: Williams v. New York49
A recent manifestation of the historical latitude allowed sentenc-
ing judges appears in Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. That rule provides for consideration by
federal judges of reports made by probation officers containing in-
formation about a convicted defendant, including such informa-
tion "as may be helpful in imposing sentence or in granting proba-
tion or in the correctional treatment of the defendant . . ."
We must recognize that most of the information now relied
upon by judges to guide them in the intelligent imposition of sen-
tences would be unavailable if information were restricted to that
given in open court by witnesses subject to cross-examination. And
the modern probation report draws on information concerning ev-
ery aspect of a defendant's life. The type and extent of this infor-
mation make totally impractical if not impossible open court tes-
timony with cross-examination. Such a procedure could endlessly
delay criminal administration in a retrial of collateral issues. (Em-
phasis supplied.)
William M. Calvert's article in The Free Press50
The judge's first consideration is that the public be protected. The
18-year-old boy who pled guilty to disorderly person was shown in
the pre-sentence investigation report to have been involved rather
extensively with dangerous drugs, and there was strong indication
that the boy had progressed from the usage to the selling of drugs
to other younger people, and there had been numerous reports to
the Sheriff's Office that the defendant was a supplier. Under these
circumstances, probation would not protect the public, and while
the alternative of a sentence in the county jail was available to* the
judge, the county jail has no program for young offenders.
49. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
50. Calvert, Voice of the People, Tna FarE PRass, Colorado Springs, p. 4, November
5, 1969..._
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Lantz v. United States"'
(5) The court below stated that it did have the benefit of full
and complete pre-sentence report. However, even if the district
court had proceeded without the report, that would not be such
error which would necessitate the vacation of the sentence. United
States v. Deas, 5th Cir. 1969, 413 F.2d 1371 (June 13, 1969).
State of Utah v. Kelbach52
(1,2) The failure of the trial court to ask a defendant, repre-
sented by an attorney, whether he has anything to say before
sentence is imposed (allocution), does not in itself constitute
constitutional error. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require a judge to have hearings and to give
a convicted person an opportunity to participate therein prior to
the determination of the sentence to be imposed. (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
State v. Scott"
The trial court's wide discretion to sentence a defendant is not
subject to interference by an appellate court unless it is clearly
demonstrated that the power has been abused .... It is not inappro-
priate for the trial court to impose a punishment justified by the
general character of both the offense and of the party convicted...
It would appear that the major thrust of defendant's complaint
about the sentences imposed is the fact that he was not apprised,
prior to sentencing, of his brother's admissions. In Arizona, we
have adopted a "middle position" as to defendant's right to inspect
a pre-sentence report, leaving it to the discretion of the trial court.
Our Supreme Court therein stated:
"And there is a middle ground in which the court may give de-
fendant's lawyer some facts concerning prior crimes, in order that
he might have an opportunity to rebut or explain them ... "
However, if the information is such that the court, in its discre-
tion, feels that the defendant should have the right to rebut or ex-
plain it the information should be revealed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Military Rule:
The military rule, as set forth in Paragraph 75, Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States, 1969 (Rev.), makes it clear that only very
limited types of evidence may be presented to the court by the prosecu-
51. 417 F.2d 329, 330 (5th Cir. 1969).
52. 23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P.2d 297, 299 (1969).
53. 11 Ariz. App. 68, 461 P.2d 712, 715 (1969).
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tion for its consideration on sentencing, and -sets forth the absolute
right of the defense to be present to submit evidence and argument and
to object, explain, or rebut anything presented by the prosecution. An
excellent example of the enforcement of these provisions may be found
in United States v. Manos:54
We are, however, concerned with impressing on all concerned
the undoubted right of the accused to secure the attendance of wit-
nesses in his own behalf; the need for seriously considering the re-
quest; and taking necessary measures to comply therewith if such
can be done without manifest injury to the service. That is what
we meant in Sweeney, supra, in speaking of weighing the relative
responsibilities of the parties against the equities of the situation.
These considerations apply equally to witnesses in extenuation
and mitigation. In many cases, as here, the Government can expect
an easy conviction either through pleas of guilty or presence of in-
contestable proof. The accused's only hope in the trial is to miti-
gate his punishment by reference to his former good record and
service. This may be done most effectively, as defense counsel
noted, by the appearance and testimony of his superiors. The situ-
ation is aggravated from his standpoint when he is tried as a transi-
ent and is separated from those familiar with his background and
abilities. That is what occurred here, and it epitomized the need
for due attention to obtaining the presence of the witnesses he re-
quested or taking their depositions.
IV. POST-TRIAL
The greatest of practical differences between the military and the ci-
vilian systems, which are of benefit to an accused, are in the post-trial
phases with regard to review for sufficiency of the evidence, appellate
review of sentences, and sentence limitations upon a rehearing.
A. Release Pending Appeal
The Bail Reform Act of 1966-5 has no applicability to the military.56
Nor was it intended by the Congress that this act should apply to the
military.57 The military does, however, have a rule similar to that set
forth in Rule 46(a)(2), FRCP, which provides for release on personal
54. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 10, 37 C.M.R. 274, 279 (1967).
55. 18 U.S.C. 3146, et seq.
56. Levy v. Resor, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 37 C.M.R. 399, 403 (1967).
57. See, S. REP. No. 750, September 16, 1965, and H. R. No. 1541, May 18, 1966 on S.
1357 and H.R. 10915, respectively.
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recognizance, but provides that each case will be decided upon its own
merits. 18 Indeed, post-trial bail has not been considered a matter of
right under the common law and is primarily a creature of statute
where it exists.
Military Rule: Paragraph 21d, Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, 1969 (Rev.).
21. ARREST AND CONFINEMENT ... d. Responsibility for
restraint after trial. Upon notification from a trial counsel of the
result of a trial (44e), a commanding officer will take prompt and
appropriate action with respect to the restraint of the person tried.
This action, depending on the circumstances, may involve the im-
mediate release of the person from any restraint pending final ac-
tion on the case. See 20d(1) and 88f.
B. Appellate Consideration of the Sufficiency
of the Evidence to Sustain a Conviction
Civilian Examples: James v. United States59
The evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the
jury verdict.
State v. O'Neal0
The function of this court, when considering the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence to sustain a criminal conviction, is limited
to ascertaining whether there was a basis in the evidence for a rea-
sonable inference of guilt.
Military Rules: 10 USC 864, Art. 64, Approval by the Convening Au-
thority.
In acting on the findings and sentence of a court-martial, the
convening authority may approve only such findings of guilty, and
the sentence or such part or amount of the sentence, as he finds
correct in law and fact and as he in his discretion determines
should be approved. Unless he indicates otherwise, approval of the
sentence is approval of the findings and sentence.
Paragraph 87a(3), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969
(Rev.).
Sufficiency of the evidence. In the course of taking action upon
a record of trial, the convening authority is empowered to weigh
58. See, United States v. Williams, 253 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir. 1958).
59. 416 F.2d 467, 470 (5th-Cir. 1969).
60. 204 Kan. 226, 461 P.2d 801, 803 (1969).
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evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine contro-
verted questions of fact. In considering the evidence he should rec-
ognize that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses, and he will
be guided by the principles stated in 74a and chapter XXVII. Un-
less he determines that a finding of guilty was established beyond a
reasonable doubt by the competent evidence of record, he must dis-
approve the finding. (Emphasis supplied.)
10 USC 866, Art. 66, Review by Court of Military Review.
(c) In a case referred to it, the Court of Military Review may act
only with respect to the findings and sentence as approved by the
convening authority. It may affirm only such findings of guilty, and
the sentence or such part or amount of the sentence, as it finds cor-
rect in law and fact and determines, on the basis of the entire rec-
ord, should be approved. In considering the record, it may weigh
the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine con-
troverted questions of fact, recognizing that the trial court saw and
heard the witnesses. (Emphasis supplied.)
C. Sentence Review
Civilian Example: United States v. Coffey6'
In the federal courts, authority once existed by statute for sen-
tence review as part of the appellate process. But revision of the
authorizing statute without mention of the subject led courts sub-
sequently to hold that they lack power to review the merits of a
sentence.
Military Rules: Paragraph 88, Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, 1969 (Rev.).
POWERS OF THE CONVENING AUTHORITY WITH
RESPECT TO THE SENTENCE. a. General. The convening
authority has the power to disapprove a legal sentence in whole or
in part, as well as the power to reduce the sentence in quality and
quantity and to change a punishment to one of a different nature,
so long as its severity is not increased. However, neither the con-
vening authority nor any other authority is authorized to increase
the punishment imposed by a court-martial....
The disapproval of a sentence nullifies it as a basis for punish-
ment;...
The sentence approved should be that which is warranted by the
circumstances of the offense and the previous record of the ac-
cused. Appropriate action should be taken to approve a less severe
61. 415 F.2d 119, 120 (10th Cir. 1969).
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Sentence when the sentence, though legal, appears unnecessarily
severe. In approving sentences, consideration should be given to
all factors, including the possibility of rehabilitation as well as the
possible deterrent effect.
Paragraph 100, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Rev.).
100. REVIEW BY THE COURT OF MILITARY REVIEW....
In a case referred to it, the Court of Military Review may act only
with respect to the findings and sentence as approved by proper au-
thority. It may affirm only such findings of guilty or such part of a
finding of guilty as includes an included offense, and the sentence
or such part of the sentence, as it finds correct in law and fact and
determines, on the basis of the entire record, should be approved.
It has generally the same powers with respect to modification of a
sentence as does the convening authority. (Emphasis supplied.)
10 USC 874. Art. 74. Remission and suspension.
(a) The Secretary concerned and, when designated by him, any Un-
der Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Judge Advocate General, or com-
manding officer may remit or suspend any part or amount of the
unexecuted part of any sentence, including all uncollected forfei-
tures other than a sentence approved by the President. (b) The Sec-
retary concerned may, for good cause, substitute an administrative
form of discharge for a discharge or dismissal executed in accor-
dance with the sentence of a court-martial.
D. Permissible Sentences on Retrial62
Civilian Examples: United States v. Kienlen63
In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), the Court held
that a more severe sentence on retrial was constitutionally permis-
sible provided that, "whenever a judge imposes a more severe sen-
tence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing
so must affirmatively appear." 395 U.S. at 726.
On his original guilty plea, Kienlen was sentenced to 12 years
imprisonment subject to parole under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2). On
the jury verdict, the judge imposed a sentence of 18 years. In im-
posing this sentence the trial judge, as if anticipating Pearce, ob-
served:
I certainly gained the impression (at the trial) and came to be-
lieve and now believe, and largely this is from the testimony of the
defendant's witnesses, his mother and his former wife, that this
62. For an in-depth discussion of this problem, see, Ashman, The Prisoner's Dilemma:
Harsher Punishment Upon Retrial, 55 A.B.A.J. 928 (1969).
63. 415 F.2d 557, 559 (10th Cir. 1969).
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defendant is a brutal, assaultive type, that this information, if I
had known it-I don't want to say that there wasn't any indication
of that in the earlier pre-sentence report, but to read something in
a cold pre-sentence report and to hear the witness, one by deposi-
tion and the other testifying from the stand, together with all of
the other information that has come to me since the original sen-
tence was imposed, I have come to the conclusion that the sentence
imposed on May 27, 1966 . . . was a lesser sentence than this defen-
dant deserved, so the sentence to be imposed today will be a greater
sentence. (Emphasis supplied.)
Lemieux v. Robbins64
We realize that if a defendant chooses a district court trial he
may thereafter be reluctant to seek correction of any errors com-
mitted therein if to do so he must risk a sentence he considers fa-
vorable. In this sense the state has "chilled" his exercise of appeal.
However, the "right" to appeal is by no means an absolute one.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has never held that a state must estab-
lish channels of appellate review, only that once established, the
state must refrain from placing unreasonable restrictions on access.
But even assuming that there is a constitutional right to some sort
of post-conviction review, see Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake:
Harsher Penalties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74
Yale L.J. 606, 613 8c n.25 (1965), procedures which merely "chill"
this right must be tolerated if they support legitimate state objec-
tives and are fair and reasonable.
Military Rules: Paragraph 81d, Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, 1969 (Rev.).
Offenses on which a rehearing or new trial is held shall not be
the basis for punishment in excess of or more severe than the legal
sentence upon a previous hearing or trial, as ultimately reduced by
the convening or other proper authority when any such action has
been taken. Thus, if the sentence in the previous proceeding to dis-
honorable discharge, confinement at hard labor for three years,
and total forfeitures was modified by a convening or other proper
authority to bad-conduct discharge, confinement at hard labor for
two years, and total forfeitures, based upon considerations of ap-
propriateness or clemency, the sentence as modified is the most se-
vere which can be predicated on findings of guilty of the reheard
offenses. (Emphasis supplied.)
64. 414 F.2d 353, 355 (1st Cir. 1969).
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United States v. Zimmerman5.
In military judicial procedure automatic considerations by a
board of review is provided. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Ar-
ticle 66; Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, para-
graph 100. * ** (A)ction by a board of review is always taken on be-
half of an accused and in his interest. Literally he can never be
prejudiced by this appellate review-for on retrial, if any, he can-
not be tried for an offense greater than that charged at the first
trial, nor can he receive a sentence greater than that adjudged at
the first trial. Uniform Code, supra, Article 63, 50 USC § 650;
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, paragraph 92; cf.
United States v. Padilla and Jacobs (No. 400), USCMA
-__ _, 5 CMR 31, decided August 19, 1952 ...
The provision for automatic review simply constitutes the de-
vice adopted by Congress for insuring that no man may stand con-
victed on an inadequate record.
V. CONCLUSION
Let us consider the words of Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the
Supreme Court in O'Callahan v. Parker.66 "A civilian trial, in other
words, is held in an atmosphere conducive to the protection of individ-
ual rights, while the military trial is marked by the age-old manifest
destiny of retributive justice."
The reader may best judge for himself the accuracy of this statement.
65. 2 U.S.C.M.A. 12, 6 C.M.R. 12, 20 (1952).
66. Supra note 1.
217
